{"id":3822,"date":"2026-11-13T15:03:42","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T15:03:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/?p=3822"},"modified":"2026-11-13T15:03:42","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T15:03:42","slug":"telecom-software-and-cybersecurity-firm-enea-exposes-silentair-mobile-infrastructure-threat-actor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/?p=3822","title":{"rendered":"Telecom Software and Cybersecurity Firm Enea Exposes &quot;SilentAir&quot; Mobile Infrastructure Threat Actor"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Telecom software and cybersecurity company Enea has detailed the activity of a previously unknown threat actor that intercepts phone calls and text messages through compromised mobile operator infrastructure, with Taiwan serving as its main target. The sophisticated campaign highlights ongoing vulnerabilities within telecommunications core networks and underscores the persistent risks posed by advanced state-sponsored espionage operations targeting critical communication infrastructure across multiple continents.<\/p>\n<p>The company tracks the newly discovered threat group under the designation SilentAir and assesses with high confidence that it represents a previously unrecognized state-level actor. State-sponsored campaigns of this nature typically demand substantial financial resources, deep technical expertise regarding telecommunications signaling protocols, and prolonged access to complex carrier environments, all of which point toward a well-resourced nation-state adversary rather than a financially motivated cybercriminal syndicate.<\/p>\n<p>Enea\u2019s researchers also believe, with low confidence, that SilentAir\u2019s activity is aligned with China-nexus operations. Their analytical reasoning includes the hackers\u2019 intense focus on Taiwan, the complete absence of any domestic Chinese targets within the scope of observed operations, and an attack timing schedule that remains consistently aligned with a standard workday within China\u2019s time zone. While these operational markers provide circumstantial insight into the possible origin and intent of the threat group, the researchers maintain a cautious low-confidence assessment pending the discovery of more definitive technical artifacts or infrastructure attribution links.<\/p>\n<p>SilentAir launches its signaling attacks, mostly over the Signaling System 7 (SS7) protocol and occasionally over the Diameter protocol, directly from network nodes it has successfully hijacked at various mobile network operators. These signaling protocols are foundational to the operation of cellular networks globally, facilitating core functions such as subscriber authentication, call routing, roaming services, and short message delivery. By compromising specific routing nodes within telecom operator environments, the hackers are able to manipulate these underlying protocols to route a target subscriber\u2019s incoming calls and SMS messages through the compromised node, effectively enabling real-time eavesdropping while harvesting sensitive subscriber details.<\/p>\n<p>Beyond intercepting voice calls and text messages, the hackers can also track a target\u2019s physical location using specialized network queries, though researchers note this capability makes up only a small part of their overall activity profile. To maintain operational discretion and verify the efficacy of their malicious routing maneuvers, SilentAir operators frequently send silent SMS messages to targeted devices. These specialized messages do not generate any visible notifications, alerts, or sounds on the recipient\u2019s phone, allowing the threat actors to silently probe device status and check whether earlier interception attempts have succeeded without alerting the subscriber or local network administrators.<\/p>\n<p>Enea has actively monitored these targeted signaling attacks since early 2025, and further retrospective digital forensics and log analysis revealed suspicious activity originating from even earlier periods, indicating that the campaign has likely been operational for a considerable duration before its initial detection. The compromised nodes utilized in the campaign belong to telecom operators located in at least six distinct Asian countries, illustrating a broad regional footprint that extends far beyond the primary focal point of Taiwan.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to Taiwan, the group has systematically targeted a dozen other countries and territories globally. During the course of their investigative tracking, researchers observed the threat actors occasionally going after high-profile individuals, including prominent political and government figures, situated in regions such as East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The inclusion of high-ranking government and political targets strongly reinforces the assessment that SilentAir operates as an intelligence-gathering instrument designed for strategic surveillance rather than indiscriminate commercial disruption.<\/p>\n<p>The comprehensive research report from Enea also covers concurrent activity observed through 2026 involving Liminal Panda, a separate threat group that cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike previously linked, with low confidence, to China-nexus operations. Enea notes that Liminal Panda stands out as the only known cyberthreat actor currently documented as actively exploiting the IPX, the critical IP packet exchange network that mobile operators globally use to securely exchange international roaming traffic, messaging data, and signaling information.<\/p>\n<p>Starting in the first quarter of 2026, Enea successfully spotted and blocked Liminal Panda\u2019s GTPDoor backdoor at several of its mobile operator customers. The GTPDoor malware is specifically designed to leverage the GPRS Tunneling Protocol, which is integral to mobile data core networks, enabling covert command-and-control communications. In total, Enea\u2019s detection mechanisms caught several hundred distinct attempts by Liminal Panda to covertly reach its command-and-control servers through the exploited infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>Enea reports that it has observed potential infections at between five and ten mobile network operators globally. Based on the scale of the infrastructure observed and the patterns of ongoing scanning and exploitation, the company estimates that the total number of affected operators could eventually reach several dozen, particularly across regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America where telecom infrastructure security postures and monitoring capabilities can vary widely.<\/p>\n<p>According to Enea, while distinct operational traits separate the two entities, SilentAir and Liminal Panda could potentially be connected, although the available technical evidence at this stage is not strong enough to establish a definitive link between the groups. Both actors, however, demonstrate an advanced understanding of telecommunications signaling and core network architecture, reflecting<\/p>\n<p>a broader trend where sophisticated threat actors increasingly bypass traditional perimeter defenses to exploit the deeply interconnected and historically vulnerable protocols underpinning global mobile telecommunications.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Telecom software and cybersecurity company Enea has detailed the activity of a previously unknown threat&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":3821,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[313],"tags":[2037,323,143,3118,399,461,321,320,815,2670,3119,474,2195,77,322],"class_list":["post-3822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-incident-response-forensics","tag-actor","tag-blockchain-analysis","tag-cybersecurity","tag-enea","tag-exposes","tag-firm","tag-forensics","tag-incident-response","tag-infrastructure","tag-mobile","tag-silentair","tag-software","tag-telecom","tag-threat","tag-tracking"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3822","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3822"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3822\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/3821"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3822"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3822"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/smartcryptosecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3822"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}