Every enterprise on the planet conducts security awareness training for its employees. From sprawling multinational corporations to small businesses, human resources and IT departments regularly mandate hours of videos, simulated phishing tests, and compliance modules. Yet, whether this multi-billion-dollar industry provides tangible benefits remains deeply debatable.
Empirical evidence increasingly suggests that traditional security awareness training simply is not working, even as successful cyberattacks continue to rise globally. Industry opinions on the efficacy of awareness training range wildly from complete skepticism to cautious optimism, with plenty of grey areas in between.
At its core, security awareness training focuses primarily on two distinct tasks: reducing the impact of poor judgment that might turn an innocent employee into an insider threat, and hardening workers against falling victim to malicious social engineering. For most cybersecurity professionals, the primary battleground is social engineering, where human psychology is exploited to breach corporate perimeters.
Compliance Theater
The majority opinion among security experts is not necessarily that training lacks theoretical value, but that it is routinely delivered ineffectively. Stefan Dasic, a senior malware research engineer at Malwarebytes, points out that the root of the problem lies in execution. "Most training programs fail because of how they’re run," Dasic suggests, noting that they are frequently repetitive and generic, rendering them utterly pointless in the eyes of employees.
According to Dasic, some of that repetition is not merely a consequence of poor instructional design. Instead, it is heavily driven by compliance frameworks and insurance mandates that legally require the exact same content to be re-delivered to every employee every single year, regardless of their prior knowledge or technical proficiency. The inherent danger here is that security awareness training is hollowed out, reduced to little more than an annual legal checkbox.
Robert Costello, chief digital and information officer at Merlin Group, echoes these concerns, arguing that too much of today’s curriculum is strictly compliance-focused. Consequently, it fails to reflect the sophisticated social engineering and artificial intelligence-enabled attacks that modern organizations face on a daily basis.
Mike Lyman, a senior security consultant at Black Duck, expands on this critique by highlighting the absurdity of professionals being forced to retake identical courses across multiple consecutive employers. This cycle of training-as-compliance-theater produces checkbox completions without driving any meaningful behavioral change. Lyman suggests this exact dynamic explains why numerous academic and industry studies find weak or null security effects even in organizations boasting near-perfect completion rates.
The fundamental flaw with compliance-driven mandates, extending far beyond awareness training, is that they establish a bare-minimum target to achieve rather than a security baseline designed for continuous improvement.

Where and When Training Works
Despite widespread disillusionment, some security leaders believe awareness training retains value, provided it is deployed correctly. Drew Thompson, global lead for training and enablement at UltraViolet Cyber, argues that training does work, but its effectiveness is largely confined to the specific scenarios explicitly covered in the curriculum. The primary bottleneck, however, is that attackers constantly shift their tactics, whereas static training typically tries to prepare people for threats that are already well-documented.
Josh Bartolomie, vice president and global head of threat intelligence at Doppel, shares this perspective. "Security awareness training still works, but many organizations are expecting it to solve a problem that’s changed," he notes.
To counter this, Thompson suggests that training must become significantly more frequent and evolve dynamically in tandem with emerging attack vectors. It should incorporate clear directions on how to react to suspicious messages through behavioral training, while remaining closely tailored to an employee’s specific role within the organization. Furthermore, Thompson emphasizes that training can never stand alone as a solitary security control; it must be firmly backed by robust technical processes, identity protections, advanced technical controls, and clear verification procedures.
Bartolomie reinforces this sentiment, arguing that while awareness remains essential, human beings can no longer realistically serve as the final line of defense against cyber threats. Technology must assume that burden.
Costello agrees, noting that security awareness training should reinforce a modern security architecture rather than act as a makeshift compensation for the complete lack of one. Biswajit De, co-founder and CTO at CleanStart, adds that awareness ought to complement good engineering rather than replace it. In his view, robust engineering assumes that systems will eventually fail, and good security must similarly assume that human beings will occasionally make mistakes.
Meanwhile, Jim Dolce, CEO at Lookout, believes training is fundamentally outmatched within today’s mobile-centric artificial intelligence threat landscape. The historical ambition of turning employees into a "human firewall" through periodic training belongs firmly to an earlier desktop era.
Frontier AI has completely rewritten the threat landscape, weaponizing social engineering to generate hyper-personalized, flawless phishing campaigns and voice clones delivered instantly across mobile channels like SMS, WhatsApp, and messaging apps. Security awareness training routinely fails because organizations are asking humans to defeat advanced AI on a tiny six-inch smartphone screen. As industry experts point out, you cannot train away a structural architectural problem.
Mike Aalto, co-founder and CEO at Hoxhunt, points to a staggering 14-fold surge in AI-generated phishing attacks observed at the turn of 2025 to 2026. According to Aalto, the major shift is not necessarily brand-new zero-day messaging tactics, but rather the rapid modernization of old attacks. Traditional phishing kits are now systematically upgraded with cleaner formatting, flawless writing, and deeply personalized messaging that can be deployed at scale.
Defense against these attacks remains an endless game of whack-a-mole. The core issue is an overwhelming increase in better-formed, AI-assisted social engineering delivered at unprecedented speed and scope via large language models.

Aalto advocates for incorporating active behavioral training alongside traditional awareness modules. By focusing on and rewarding a few measurable core behaviors—such as rapid threat reporting and multi-factor authentication usage—organizations can establish a cultural bedrock of secure habits. Replacing fear and heavy-handed surveillance with continuous learning and automated behavioral interventions reduces negligence and transforms the workforce into an active, intelligent human sensor network capable of catching threats that technology might otherwise miss.
However, Sanny Liao, co-founder and chief product officer at Fable Security, offers a more blunt assessment. For the most part, she argues, security awareness training as it is currently practiced simply does not work. Social engineering continues to succeed because malicious actors exploit context, timing, and fundamental human psychology, whereas most corporate training remains generic, infrequent, and entirely detached from the exact moments when employees are making critical business decisions.
Lyman points to a recurring contradiction faced by awareness trainers. Data from platforms like KnowBe4 frequently demonstrates that simulated phishing exercises can produce measurable, immediate reductions in an organization’s phish-prone percentage. However, academic studies consistently reveal that this protective effect fades rapidly, with strong post-course improvements disappearing entirely within a matter of months.
Advantage to the Attacker
Social engineers maintain three primary advantages over traditional security awareness training: structural asymmetry, the proactive nature of attacks versus reactive defense, and the complexities of human psychology.
The first advantage is asymmetry. The cybersecurity axiom dictates that defenders must be right every single time, while attackers only need to be successful once. To combat modern social engineering, every individual employee must successfully identify and block every malicious actor, every time, operating at machine speed. Conversely, out of hundreds of thousands of AI-assisted attacks, an attacker only requires a single distracted worker on a busy afternoon to break through.
The second advantage involves predicting the future. Trainers primarily teach employees how to recognize yesterday’s attacks. While exceptional training might help recognize today’s threats, it is difficult to imagine how standard awareness training can prepare a workforce for the completely novel and evolving attacks arriving tomorrow. Organizations cannot teach what they do not yet know, meaning training can easily become obsolete by the time it is deployed.
The third advantage is human psychology. Human memory and motivation are profoundly complex. Expecting an employee whose full-time job is accounting or project management to match the vigilance of an attacker whose full-time job is psychological manipulation is an uphill battle, even before accounting for natural memory retention decay.
The Psychology of Awareness Training
To explore this dimension further, cognitive psychologist Jordan Richard Schoenherr, PhD, a scientist at Humanix and adjunct professor at the University of New South Wales, emphasizes that the default state of human memory is rapid forgetting, or entropy.
Frequently refreshing educational content is necessary to maintain long-term memory traces. However, Schoenherr notes that even successful memory retention does not guarantee an employee will know when and where to apply that knowledge in real-world moments of decision-making. Consequently, complementary approaches like behavioral nudges are required to reactivate that stored information within a specific operational context.

Training necessarily focuses on teaching students how to recognize known social engineering patterns. Yet, this reliance on recognizable indicators can introduce dangerous false assumptions. For instance, while training often highlights old "Nigerian scams" riddled with spelling and grammatical errors, the absence of those specific flags in a modern, AI-generated phishing email is frequently misinterpreted by employees as proof of validity. In security, the absence of proof is never proof of absence.
Schoenherr explains that when humans engage in creative tasks such as predicting future attack vectors, the brain activates two primary regions: the inferior temporal lobe, where long-term memories reside, and the prefrontal cortex, which handles executive functions. The brain pulls building blocks from memory, rearranges them, and attempts to construct a mental model based on analogical reasoning.
While short-term predictions can be successfully made by individuals who deeply understand existing variables, those predictions inevitably break down as entirely new variables enter the equation. To navigate this reality, organizations must embrace decision-making under deep uncertainty. This approach requires developing multiple potential scenarios based on known variables and running simulations to determine which strategies yield the best outcomes across various iterations.
Cognitive psychology helps illuminate the complexities of memory maintenance, information retrieval, and future threat projection, all of which are essential for developing better training methodologies.
Summary
Understanding cognitive psychology cannot single-handedly solve the structural asymmetry of the social engineering threat. That fundamental imbalance can only be reduced with substantial security investments, which most enterprise budgets rarely accommodate. However, psychological insights can significantly improve how organizations predict the future direction of social engineering and design far more effective awareness training methodologies.
By combining lessons learned from current awareness techniques with insights from cognitive science, organizations can develop improved training frameworks. While awareness training will never be absolute perfection, it cannot be abandoned, and it can always be optimized.

