In a development that has caught the attention of global cybersecurity researchers, the Iranian state-sponsored threat group known as "Prince of Persia"—also tracked by the security community as Infy—has returned to active operations following its longest period of documented dormancy. According to new research from the cybersecurity firm Semperis, the group recently pivoted its infrastructure to host a command-and-control (C&C) server within the United States, a tactical shift that marks a departure from its historical operational patterns.
Prince of Persia has been a persistent presence in the digital landscape for nearly two decades. Throughout its long operational history, the group has primarily focused on the systematic targeting of Iranian dissidents, alongside a broad range of government and private sector entities across the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Its longevity and consistent focus on espionage make it one of the more enduring actors in the state-sponsored threat landscape.
The recent discovery of the group’s activities comes after a period of intense scrutiny. Tomer Bar, AVP of security research at Semperis, who tracked the threat actor extensively during his previous tenure at SafeBreach, provided crucial insights into the group’s recent movements. According to Bar, the group’s operational cadence was disrupted significantly in early 2026. Following the publication of a comprehensive report by SafeBreach in February 2026, which detailed the inner workings of the group’s infrastructure, the hackers took immediate defensive measures. Within just one week of the report’s release, Prince of Persia abruptly took a primary C&C server offline and began a complex process of relocating its remaining assets.
What followed was a three-month period of near-total silence. For an actor that has been active for nearly twenty years, this three-month hiatus represents the longest confirmed period of inactivity in its history. This temporal gap is particularly noteworthy because it coincided almost perfectly with the escalation of tensions between Iran, the United States, and Israel, which saw a surge in regional cyber hostilities starting on February 28, 2026.
While researchers have previously noted "quiet periods" in the group’s activity, Semperis emphasized to SecurityWeek that this specific instance of downtime is uniquely verified. Unlike past gaps, which were often attributed to a lack of visibility or a loss of telemetry, researchers maintained continuous monitoring of the group’s infrastructure throughout the duration of this recent silence. Consequently, the three-month pause serves as a confirmed operational lull rather than a reporting artifact, suggesting that the threat group either prioritized stealth or was forced into a period of reorganization due to the intense geopolitical climate and external pressure from security researchers.
The group’s reemergence was officially confirmed on May 27, 2026, when it deployed a new command-and-control server and immediately resumed data exfiltration activities. The efficacy of their updated tooling was quickly apparent; within a seven-day window, the group’s "Tonnerre" malware family successfully siphoned more than 1,800 sensitive files from a single victim. Despite this successful breach, Bar notes that the overall victim count remains relatively small. This limited footprint could suggest several possibilities: the group may be exercising extreme caution by running highly targeted, precision-based campaigns, or they may be encountering significant challenges in successfully compromising new systems in a hardened threat landscape.
The sophistication of the group’s infrastructure continued to evolve through the summer. In August, Bar identified a new server, which forensic analysis suggests was likely constructed on July 7. This server was designed to support the second stage of "Tornado," the group’s latest malware family. Tornado is notable for its specialized capabilities, most notably its ability to steal and exfiltrate sensitive files through a Telegram bot—a method that leverages legitimate, encrypted communication channels to obfuscate malicious data movement.
Perhaps the most significant finding regarding this new infrastructure was its geographic placement. For the first time since 2016, Prince of Persia hosted a command-and-control server within the United States. While it is not inherently unusual for nation-state-sponsored threat actors to utilize cloud infrastructure and web hosting providers located in the US to mask their activities, it represents a marked deviation from the established behavior of this specific actor.
Bar highlighted the tactical shift in how the group chose to host this infrastructure. Rather than relying on traditional virtual private servers (VPSs), which are commonly used by threat actors, the group transitioned to Namecheap shared hosting. This move placed their malicious activity on a platform that hosts thousands of legitimate websites, as well as domains operated by a variety of other, unrelated threat actors. "This is the last place we expected to find Prince of Persia hiding," Bar remarked, noting the effectiveness of using such a "noisy" environment to blend into the background of standard web traffic.
However, the group’s ability to remain hidden was short-lived. By August 24, Semperis observed the group initiating the setup of yet another Tornado second-stage server, this time concealed behind the Cloudflare content delivery network. Researchers suspect that the actors realized their US-based shared hosting server had been compromised or identified, prompting a rapid pivot to a more robust defensive layer.
The implications of these movements are significant for organizations tasked with defending against nation-state actors. By operating within US borders and utilizing legitimate, high-traffic infrastructure providers, Prince of Persia is effectively attempting to weaponize the ubiquity of the modern internet against security defenders. Their reliance on Telegram bots for exfiltration further complicates detection, as traditional network security tools may struggle to distinguish between legitimate user communication and malicious data transfer.
In response to these findings, Semperis has taken the proactive step of sharing Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) associated with the recent iterations of the Prince of Persia infrastructure. The firm strongly advises organizations to integrate these IoCs into their existing security monitoring tools and to maintain heightened vigilance regarding suspicious or unauthorized Telegram-related traffic originating from their internal networks.
The persistence of the Prince of Persia group, coupled with its willingness to adapt its infrastructure and hosting strategies, underscores the ongoing challenge of mitigating state-sponsored cyber espionage. As geopolitical tensions continue to influence the priorities of such groups, the ability to rapidly identify, track, and disrupt the command-and-control mechanisms of these actors remains a cornerstone of enterprise defense. The group’s recent shift to US-based hosting is a clear signal that the digital battleground is increasingly characterized by blurred lines, where the infrastructure of legitimate commerce is frequently repurposed as a staging ground for sophisticated, long-term espionage campaigns.
As the cybersecurity community continues to analyze the aftermath of this latest operational cycle, the focus remains on the intersection of technical ingenuity and geopolitical strategy. Whether the group will continue to favor US-based infrastructure or retreat to more traditional, non-Western hosting environments remains to be seen. However, the vigilance of researchers like those at Semperis ensures that even the most well-hidden threats, operating in the busiest corners of the web, remain under the watchful eyes of those dedicated to maintaining digital integrity. For now, the "Prince of Persia" remains active, a testament to the enduring and adaptive nature of modern, state-aligned cyber threats.

