18 Nov 2026, Wed

BMRaccoon: Researchers Unveil First Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Blind Multi-Signature Scheme

A team of researchers from the Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad and the Indian Institute of Information Technology Design and Manufacturing, Kurnool, has introduced a significant advancement in post-quantum cryptography. In a newly released research paper designated as Paper 2026/2870 on the Cryptology ePrint Archive, the authors present "BMRaccoon: Blind Multi-Signatures from Lattices." This development marks the introduction of the first lattice-based post-quantum blind multi-signature scheme, offering a foundational cryptographic tool designed to secure decentralized systems against the impending capabilities of quantum computing.

The research team comprises Keerthi Aiswarya Varshini, Kanchan Bisht, Palkesh Jain, and Maria Francis from the Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad, alongside R. Kabaleeshwaran from the Indian Institute of Information Technology Design and Manufacturing, Kurnool. Their collaborative work addresses a critical vulnerability in current cryptographic infrastructure, as traditional digital signature schemes and decentralized protocols face theoretical threats from advanced quantum computers capable of solving complex mathematical problems far more efficiently than classical machines.

Understanding Blind Multi-Signatures in the Post-Quantum Era

To fully grasp the significance of BMRaccoon, it is necessary to examine the cryptographic primitive it establishes: the blind multi-signature. Blind multi-signatures combine the properties of blind signatures and multi-signatures. A blind signature allows a user to obtain a valid signature on a hidden or encrypted message from a signer, ensuring that the signer learns nothing about the message content. This mechanism is widely used in applications requiring user anonymity, such as electronic cash systems, privacy-preserving credential issuance, and anonymous token generation.

Multi-signatures, on the other hand, enable a group of multiple signers to collaboratively generate a single, compact signature that is verifiable under a combined verification key representing the entire group. When these two concepts are merged into a blind multi-signature scheme, a user can obtain a single, highly compact signature on a hidden message through the joint, coordinated participation of multiple independent signers. This provides a robust cryptographic foundation for the decentralized issuance of anonymous tokens, allowing decentralized networks to issue privacy-preserving assets without relying on a single, centralized authority.

However, prior to this research, constructing efficient and secure blind multi-signatures rooted in lattice-based cryptography—which is widely considered resilient against quantum attacks—remained an open challenge. Most existing schemes relied on traditional number-theoretic assumptions, such as RSA or discrete logarithms, which are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm running on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. By shifting the mathematical foundation to lattices, the researchers behind BMRaccoon aim to secure these privacy-enhancing protocols for the post-quantum era.

The Architecture of BMRaccoon and the MRaccoon Building Block

BMRaccoon is introduced as the first lattice-based post-quantum blind multi-signature construction that operates via a two-round signing protocol. This protocol is engineered to remain secure even under concurrent sessions, meaning that multiple signing operations can take place simultaneously without compromising the security of the overall system. Furthermore, the resulting signatures are syntactically compatible with Raccoon, an existing lattice-based signature framework, under the combined sum of the individual signers’ verification keys.

To construct BMRaccoon securely, the authors first had to develop a fundamental building block: MRaccoon. Described in the research paper as the first Raccoon-based multi-signature scheme, MRaccoon serves as the underlying engine that makes the higher-level blind multi-signature construction possible. The research team formally proves the strong unforgeability of MRaccoon under two specific mathematical hardness assumptions: the Algebraic One-More MISIS (AOM-MISIS) assumption and the standard MSIS (Module Short Integer Solution) assumption.

This security analysis is conducted within the random oracle model and the knowledge-of-secret-key (KOSK) model, providing a rigorous theoretical backing for the scheme’s resilience against sophisticated adversaries attempting to forge signatures or extract unauthorized credentials. Building upon this foundation, the modular security analysis of BMRaccoon establishes its one-more unforgeability through a straight-line reduction to the strong unforgeability of MRaccoon. In this analytical model, the user’s blinding contribution is ingeniously treated as an auxiliary signer operating with a zero verification key, simplifying the security proofs while maintaining rigorous cryptographic guarantees.

In addition to proving unforgeability against rogue or malicious actors, the researchers also rigorously prove the property of blindness against malicious and colluding signers. This ensures that even if a subset of the participating signers attempts to collaborate to deanonymize the user or learn the content of the hidden message, the privacy protections inherent in the protocol hold firm.

Performance and Concrete Instantiation

Beyond theoretical security proofs and architectural design, the practicality of any cryptographic scheme depends heavily on its concrete performance metrics, such as signature size and key length. In the context of post-quantum lattice-based cryptography, managing the size of public keys and signatures has historically been a significant engineering challenge, as lattice schemes often require larger parameters than their classical counterparts.

According to the parameters evaluated in the research paper, BMRaccoon demonstrates practical feasibility for real-world deployment scenarios. For a system scaled to support up to $q_s = 2^32$ concurrent signing sessions involving $n = 32$ distinct signers, the concrete instantiation of the scheme yields compact outputs. Specifically, the resulting signatures are approximately 67 kilobytes in size, while the associated verification keys measure approximately 15 kilobytes. These dimensions strike a balance between post-quantum security requirements and the bandwidth limitations inherent in network communications and distributed ledger environments.

The release of Paper 2026/2870 on the Cryptology ePrint Archive provides the complete technical specification, comprehensive security proofs, and formal definitions for both BMRaccoon and its underlying MRaccoon building block. Researchers and developers working on post-quantum cryptography, decentralized identity systems, and privacy-preserving protocols can access the full paper and its associated cryptographic parameters online through the IACR ePrint archive under the identifier 2026/2870, with BibTeX citation data available for academic referencing.

By Sagoh

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