For decades, the password has stood as the primary gatekeeper of the digital world—and for just as long, it has been one of cybersecurity’s most persistent and catastrophic vulnerabilities. Despite the evolution of complex requirements, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and password managers, the human element remains the weak link. Users frequently forget, reuse, and share passwords, often surrendering them to increasingly sophisticated phishing campaigns. Today, attackers are not just guessing passwords; they are leveraging automated credential stuffing and artificial intelligence to make social engineering more effective than ever before. As the industry shifts toward a passwordless future, passkeys have emerged as the leading solution to this systemic crisis. However, while passkeys offer a robust defense against traditional credential theft, they are not a panacea for the broader challenges of identity security.
What Are Passkeys?
Passkeys represent a fundamental shift in how we approach digital authentication. Built on the foundation of public-key cryptography, they replace the concept of a "shared secret"—like a password that both the user and the server must know—with cryptographic credentials. In a passkey-enabled system, the user’s device holds a private cryptographic key, while the service provider retains the corresponding public key.
Crucially, the private key is never transmitted during the authentication process. Because there is no secret to intercept, steal, or reuse, passkeys are inherently phishing-resistant; the authentication process is cryptographically bound to the legitimate service, meaning a fake site cannot trick a user into providing their credentials. By removing the need for users to remember complex passwords or wait for SMS-based one-time passcodes, passkeys promise to reconcile the often-conflicting goals of security and usability. For many organizations, the transition to passkeys is a welcome upgrade to a more secure and streamlined authentication model. Yet, this transition carries a hidden danger: the assumption that a more secure login process equates to a secure identity.
What Passkeys Get Right
The limitations of traditional authentication methods have become painfully clear in recent years. Many organizations still rely on a combination of passwords and secondary factors, such as SMS codes, push notifications, or one-time passcodes (OTP). While this is undeniably better than a password alone, these methods are far from infallible. They remain susceptible to adversary-in-the-middle attacks, where attackers intercept authentication traffic in real-time, as well as MFA fatigue, SIM swapping, and social engineering.
Passkeys disrupt this model by eliminating the reusable secret. Because the authentication is tied to a hardware-backed private key on the user’s device, the entire class of attacks built around credential theft—including database breaches and phishing—is largely mitigated. Furthermore, the user experience is vastly improved. Instead of juggling a mental list of complex passwords or reaching for a secondary device to verify a code, the user can authenticate using a simple biometric or device PIN. This creates a powerful incentive for both users and service providers to adopt the technology. However, the mistake would be assuming that stronger authentication resolves the fundamental problem of identity security.
Authentication Is Not Identity
It is a common misconception in cybersecurity to conflate "successful authentication" with "verified identity." When a passkey authentication event concludes successfully, the system has obtained strong cryptographic evidence that the credential associated with an account has completed the process. That is a significant technical milestone, but it does not tell the whole story.
A perfectly functioning authentication mechanism cannot compensate for an identity that should never have been trusted in the first place. For instance, if an attacker manages to establish or hijack an account before a passkey is even bound to it, the organization may find itself in a situation where it is performing a highly secure, cryptographic authentication of the wrong person. The stronger the authentication method, the more critical the integrity of the initial enrollment process becomes. If the "front door" is locked with a sophisticated cryptographic key, but the "registration office" that issued the key was compromised or bypassed, the security of the entire system is undermined.
The Challenge of Device Changes and Recovery
The reality of modern digital life is that users do not remain static. People lose their phones, damage their hardware, or switch between technology ecosystems. When a user loses access to the device that holds their passkey, the organization is forced to pivot from the world of seamless authentication to the often-fraught world of account recovery.
Passkey synchronization, which allows credentials to be backed up and restored across supported devices, addresses many of these common scenarios. However, organizations must still provide a path for users who arrive without access to their expected passkey. If the recovery fallback relies on legacy methods—such as email links, SMS codes, knowledge-based security questions, or manual help desk processes—attackers will inevitably target these weaker paths. In such cases, the passkey itself has not been compromised, but the attacker has effectively bypassed it by exploiting the recovery process. This highlights a critical requirement: organizations need a secure, robust way to re-establish trust in an identity before associating a new authenticator or device with an existing account.
Authentication Is Only One Moment
A further gap in many current identity architectures lies in the "authenticate and forget" mentality. Many systems operate on a simple, linear sequence: verify the user, grant access, and trust the resulting session until it expires. Modern cyberattacks, however, rarely stop at the login screen. Attackers have become experts at hijacking authenticated sessions, compromising trusted devices, abusing assigned privileges, and manipulating account attributes long after the initial login.
In these instances, the authentication mechanism may have functioned exactly as designed. The system verified that the user was who they claimed to be at the moment of login, but it failed to account for the risk that the session might be compromised five minutes later. The question for security teams cannot simply be, "Did this user authenticate successfully?" It must also be, "Do we still have sufficient evidence to trust this identity and its ongoing activity?"
Layering Identity Threat Detection
This is where identity threat detection and response (ITDR) becomes an essential partner to passkeys. Instead of treating successful authentication as a permanent declaration of trust, organizations should continuously evaluate identity risk. By analyzing device characteristics, behavioral anomalies, network intelligence, and transaction context, security teams can determine whether an identity remains trustworthy throughout the duration of a session.
This approach does not necessarily require adding friction to every interaction. A risk-based model can allow legitimate, predictable users to proceed without interruption while escalating controls only when the risk profile changes. For example, a known user authenticating from a recognized device and behaving in a standard manner may require no intervention. Conversely, if that same account suddenly requests a recovery on an unfamiliar device, attempts to change sensitive account attributes, or engages in anomalous transaction patterns, the system should trigger additional identity verification. The model shifts from "authenticate once and trust thereafter" to "establish trust, continuously evaluate, and respond to shifts in risk."
The Future of Identity Security
Passkeys and identity threat detection address two distinct, yet complementary, parts of the identity attack surface. Passkeys excel at reducing risks associated with passwords, credential theft, and phishing—the primary drivers of account takeover today. Identity threat detection addresses the broader risks that occur around the authentication lifecycle, including enrollment, recovery, session management, and post-authentication activity.
As organizations succeed in moving toward a passwordless future, attackers will inevitably adapt. They will move away from attacking the authenticator directly and instead focus on the gaps in the ecosystem—the recovery paths, the session tokens, and the administrative interfaces. This does not mean that passkeys have failed. Rather, it indicates that they have succeeded in making the "front door" significantly harder to breach, forcing attackers to search for opportunities elsewhere.
Passkeys answer the critical question of whether a user possesses a legitimate credential at the moment of entry. However, identity threat detection addresses the question that remains vital throughout the entire lifecycle of an account: Should we still trust this identity? To build a truly resilient security posture, organizations must answer both.

