U.S. federal investigators pursuing the prolific ShinyHunters hacking group—which recently shocked the cybersecurity community by stealing highly sensitive data from the FBI—have uncovered deep, illicit ties within the cyber extortion ecosystem. According to sources close to the investigation, authorities have identified executives at two different ransomware negotiation firms who maintained unusually close relations with the extortion collective. Investigators have learned that one of these U.S.-based executives even went so far as to actively help ShinyHunters operate a dedicated website designed to pressure breach victims into paying steep ransoms.
Hackers aligned with ShinyHunters have claimed responsibility for dozens of major corporate and institutional data breaches since 2019. In its early years, the group was primarily operated by cybercriminals residing in France. However, as those original members were systematically arrested and jailed, control over the ShinyHunters brand eventually transitioned to an administrator known as "Rey." Last year, Rey was identified as a teenage hacker operating out of Amman, Jordan. According to estimates from the FBI, the ShinyHunters syndicate has successfully extorted more than $70 million from corporate and government victims so far this year alone.
The group’s brazen activities crossed a major threshold in late September when ShinyHunters successfully breached the FBI recruitment portal, fbijobs.gov. To mock federal law enforcement, the hackers threatened to publicly release a trove of stolen internal files. Reports indicated that the leaked cache contained deeply personal information, including medical and psychological records, Social Security numbers, home addresses, and detailed data regarding each employee’s specialized unit and assignment.
The attack on the FBI jobs portal prompted the bureau to move with uncommon speed to arrest, detain, and question individuals who had maintained communications with Rey or other key suspects. On October 3, Reuters reported that Rey had been detained by Jordanian authorities and was actively cooperating with federal investigators.
Rey’s consolidation of power over the hacking group had followed the sudden capture of one of its alleged senior operatives. On the evening of September 15, 2026, law enforcement authorities in the Netherlands executed a high-stakes arrest, utilizing flash-bang grenades to stun and apprehend convicted hacker and ShinyHunters suspect Pepijn van der Stap as he was actively logged into various online accounts.
According to sources close to the case, Dutch police arrested Van der Stap while he was using his Signal instant messaging application. This tactical seizure allowed investigators to immediately access and read recent communications with frequent contacts, including ransomware negotiators based in Canada and the United States.

Multiple sources with knowledge of the investigation revealed that Van der Stap’s decrypted Signal messages proved critical in unraveling an emerging murder-for-hire plot that surfaced immediately following his arrest. Dutch news outlet RTL reported last month that two contract murders were allegedly planned to be carried out abroad, with investigators finding indications that Van der Stap had issued the orders for the attacks, though there is no evidence that those directives were ever executed.
The digital footprint recovered from Van der Stap’s device quickly cascaded into further arrests. On October 9, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that the FBI had arrested Edward Dubrovsky, a 54-year-old Canadian cybersecurity executive, in connection with the ongoing ShinyHunters probe. Dubrovsky, who had recently published a book on handling cyber extortion that advised victims to always engage with threat actors, was formally charged with threatening to disclose stolen data and interfering with interstate commerce through extortion, according to federal court records. Politico reported that prosecutors have asked that Dubrovsky remain in custody pending trial, and that all case-related records remain under seal.
Sources close to the investigation stated that Van der Stap’s Signal logs showed frequent, direct conversations between the Dutch hacker, Dubrovsky, and at least one executive at a major U.S.-based consulting firm. Remarkably, these messages indicated that the executives frequently possessed detailed knowledge of fresh ShinyHunters cyberattacks and data thefts before the victim organizations themselves had even discovered the breaches.
Furthermore, federal investigators uncovered what they consider a potentially explosive finding: the chat logs allegedly show that Dubrovsky was fully aware that ShinyHunters had managed to siphon highly sensitive data from FBI servers. Despite this knowledge, he never informed the bureau of the breach prior to the hacking group publicizing its extortion threats on Twitter/X.
SHINYWIRE
As the probe widened, investigators discovered that the operational footprint of the extortion ring extended far beyond simple messaging chats. Sources close to the ShinyHunters probe revealed that FBI investigators believe at least one executive at a prominent U.S.-based consulting firm played an active role in operating "shinywire[.]com," a now-defunct extortion portal utilized by the hackers. Because formal criminal charges have not yet been filed, KrebsOnSecurity is withholding the name of the U.S. company and the suspected executive, though the firm is known to be prestigious, employing more than 1,000 associates.
The Shinywire website remained active from approximately May 3, 2026, until October 16, listing nearly 100 organizations that had fallen victim to ShinyHunters breaches. Each profile on the site urged targeted entities to open a dialogue with the cybercrime syndicate to negotiate payment terms. The pages also featured damning samples of stolen corporate files, accompanied by explicit warnings that the full data caches would be published online if demands were ignored.

Cached records from scanning services such as urlscan.io captured the extent of the extortion operation. One notable listing targeted Intuitive Surgical, an American medical technology company that suffered a network breach in March 2026 after an employee fell victim to a targeted phishing email that compromised corporate credentials.
Under the mechanics of the scheme, victim organizations that refused to engage or negotiate within a strict seven-day window found their stolen records permanently published on the main ShinyHunters shaming blog, a dark web platform accessible exclusively through the Tor anonymity network.
The legal and professional fallout from the investigation has already sparked bitter corporate feuds. In a report published on October 15, The Globe and Mail detailed that months prior to his arrest, Edward Dubrovsky had filed a lawsuit in Ontario against Daniel Tobok, the former chief executive of Cypfer—a Toronto-founded cybersecurity firm with international offices spanning the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, and Mexico. Dubrovsky claimed in court documents that he had become collateral damage in a campaign by a former business partner aiming to destroy another industry executive.
Dubrovsky and Tobok initially became business partners in 2017, later building Cypfer together, where Dubrovsky served as a managing partner and chief operating officer. However, by 2024, their partnership had fractured. Dubrovsky alleged that Tobok gradually edged him out of core business operations and began making increasingly capricious decisions. Tobok denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim accusing Dubrovsky of accessing confidential information and engaging in unfair competition through work with a separate entity named CyberSteward Inc. Tobok also maintained that Dubrovsky had misrepresented his status as a firm founder and held no equity shares.
GHOSTBYTE
The investigation’s reach into historical cyber incidents has also brought older aliases back into the spotlight. According to interviews with several former colleagues, Daniel Tobok was known within ransomware circles as far back as eight years ago by a distinct moniker: "Ghostbyte."
In 2018, a Canadian company fell victim to an intrusion by Dharma, a prolific Russian-language ransomware affiliate program that first emerged in 2016. When the victim company informed the Dharma representative that they were leaning toward paying the ransom because critical encrypted files were unrecoverable, they asked for stronger guarantees that the hackers would honor their word.

In a redacted email response recovered from the incident, the Dharma representative explicitly directed the victim to seek out a specific contact at a Canadian IT firm known for handling such agreements, advising them to reach out to the email address [email protected]. The Dharma rep wrote that the IT company frequently solved such problems in Canada, telling the victim to sign a service contract while acknowledging they would still have to pay.
While it remains unclear whether Tobok personally utilized the Ghostbyte email address provided by the Dharma affiliate, and despite Tobok failing to respond to repeated requests for comment, digital footprint analysis offers a potential link. Constella Intelligence, a breach-tracking service, identified that an email address frequently used by Tobok—[email protected]—was tied to two online accounts utilizing the username "ghostbyte," including a Snapchat profile. Furthermore, Constella’s analysis linked the Dharma representative’s email address, [email protected], to a cryptocurrency wallet that processed 38 transactions totaling roughly 43 bitcoins, valued at approximately $3.5 million at current rates, with its most recent transaction dated February 2019.
In a formal statement released on October 14, Cypfer maintained that its core business operations do not involve making or facilitating ransomware payments, adding that company leadership learned of Dubrovsky’s arrest through media reports. A spokesperson emphasized that the firm had received no outreach from law enforcement and was not the target of any active government investigation.
The statement further clarified that CyberSteward and Cypfer operate as entirely separate entities with no shared officers, directors, or employees. Cypfer was recently acquired by the Apros Group, a holding company led by Jason Hogg, a former FBI special agent and former CEO of Aon Cyber Solutions Group. Aon previously acquired Cytelligence in 2020, a security consultancy where Tobok served as founder and CEO, and Dubrovsky acted as a managing partner.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
The unfolding criminal investigations highlight a complex legal and ethical landscape within the cybersecurity industry. In the United States, paying a ransom to decrypt infected systems or secure a promise to delete stolen data is not inherently illegal. The practice only crosses legal boundaries if a victim organization makes a payment to a terrorist or criminal group explicitly sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department. At present, ShinyHunters is not listed among those officially sanctioned entities.
Industry experts note that cyber insurance providers typically direct corporate victims toward specific incident response firms following a breach. However, not all forensic response providers are willing to facilitate extortion payments. When conservative firms refuse to reward attackers, victims frequently replace them with negotiators who have fewer reservations about paying.

A prominent example occurred in December 2024, when ShinyHunters targeted educational technology firm PowerSchool, stealing private records belonging to 62 million students and 9.5 million teachers across the U.S. and Canada. PowerSchool reportedly paid a $2.85 million ransom. Documentation regarding the incident indicated the firm was assisted by CyberSteward. A 20-year-old ShinyHunters affiliate from Massachusetts, Matthew Lane, was subsequently sentenced in November 2025 to four years in prison for his role in the PowerSchool attack.
Despite the payment, the remediation failed to prevent subsequent fallout. By May 2025, individual school districts began receiving independent ransom demands utilizing samples of the exact same stolen records. While law enforcement has not accused ShinyHunters of orchestrating the secondary wave of extortion, the incident underscores a fundamental reality of modern cybercrime: there is no reliable technical mechanism to verify that threat actors have truly deleted stolen data, nor can a payment prevent separate bad actors from abusing compromised records.
Leading incident response firms, including Coveware and Unit 221B, have consistently warned victims against paying ShinyHunters, pointing out that supposedly destroyed data is frequently retained, resold, or used to directly target a company’s customer base later on. The FBI reinforced this position in a May 15 advisory explicitly urging organizations not to pay the group.
This hardline stance has made firms like Coveware a direct target for the hackers. Private Telegram chats reviewed by investigators show that ShinyHunters leadership grew increasingly frustrated by Coveware’s public warnings, complaining that the firm was severely damaging their monetization rates and actively trying to "eliminate the problem."
Mark Camillo, chief executive of CyberAcuView—an industry group founded in 2021 by major cyber insurance carriers—pointed out that fee structures within the negotiation sector often create inherent conflicts of interest. While some firms operate on flat retainers, those specializing in ransom negotiations frequently charge a percentage of the total payout.
Camillo explained that this dynamic provides negotiators with a perverse financial incentive to drive up ransom amounts and favor the attackers’ terms rather than successfully driving prices down. He emphasized that the industry requires greater transparency to eliminate misaligned incentives that allow intermediaries to profit directly from the sheer volume of illicit transactions.
The U.S. Department of Justice has increasingly targeted intermediaries who abuse their positions of trust. On October 7, federal prosecutors charged MonsterCloud CEO Zohar Pinhasi with wire fraud and conspiracy. According to the indictment, Pinhasi allegedly charged clients millions for remediation while secretly paying out $8 million to ransomware groups behind their backs. Similarly, in July, Angelo Martino, a 41-year-old ransomware negotiator from Florida, was sentenced to 70 months in prison for conspiring with the BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware collective to extort victims by leaking confidential negotiation strategies to the attackers to maximize ransom demands.

